Emelia/Emi

🔒 Manual approval

@becomethewaifu@tech.lgbt

If you can't be with your waifu, become her. She/Her, Rather skittish. Am a giant nerd for trains, old computer stuff, and IPv6.

Follow requests subject to a loose vibe check.

Gender
HTTP 418 I'm a teapot
Location
HTTP 401 Unauthorized
PGP
8900D5D4DB0AB41140C4012E379261EFD5FEA871
Age
Pre-Y2K
Optimal operating temperature
68F/20C
Absolute Maximum operating temperature
74F/23C
Storage Capacity
~70TB

Replying to @RnDanger@infosec.exchange

@RnDanger @CyberPunker extremely unlikely. From my knowledge you'd need to use a malicious tower that the user connects to, then send a zero-click SMS exploit or something, which would require breaking the network's security now that mutual authentication of the tower is a thing.

The study appears to be about asking existing towers whether or not a known identity is connected, which is definitely still a significant tracking risk, but it's a much smaller one than the previous attacks that could just hoover up everyone in an area. (it needs to be done in real time, and you need to already know the ID you want to track beforehand. So "gather the IDs of everyone in this area" can't be done with it)

Replying to @RnDanger@infosec.exchange

@RnDanger Half the damn article is FUD conflating wifi with cellular, as well as "encrypted" meaning "safe", but somehow "encrypted wifi networks aren't always encrypted" or some other bullshit? I'd want to look into how the actual feature is implemented before I can say anything concrete about it.

As for IMEI sniffers, 2g is disabled on real towers. But unless you went out of your way to disable it on your phone, fake ones can still "downgrade" to it with the reduced security, allowing them to listen in on your calls and texts.

IIRC 5g's bootstrap process is similar to TLS, where the tower is authenticated via a certificate before the IMEI is sent, so it's much less vulnerable to this?